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Executive Summary
In 2011, the Government of the State of Bahia launched its “Vida Melhor” (A Better Life) Program, 
to promote social and productive inclusion of disadvantaged (low-income, also called “popular”) 
entrepreneurs, so defined by their social vulnerability and difficulties in entering the formal labor 
market. Vida Melhor developed its own approach aligned with those features and based on the 
presence in poor communities of Socio-Productive Inclusion Units (UNIS) and of Development 
Agents residing in those communities. The Agents interact with entrepreneurs through participatory 
Economic Feasibility Studies (EFS), sharing knowledge to enhance businesses and identifying 
demands to be met through a package of technical assistance provided through Vida Melhor, 
including professional training services, microcredit, registration of small businesses and donation  
of equipment. The Agents also identify demands for social policies, which are referred to  
the responsible public services.
Vida Melhor is aimed at helping the State government overcome social, economic, cultural and 
symbolic barriers faced by disadvantaged entrepreneurs, in order to promote their economic and 
social inclusion by enhancing, respectively, their businesses and revenue and their access to other 
social programs. The case study shows how a governmental social policy interacts with and provides 
services to a highly vulnerable, unorganized sector.
This study made it clear that the format chosen (community presence, neighborhood agents, 
dialogue and educational interaction) was successful in attaining the involvement and sharing basic 
business notions with disadvantaged entrepreneurs, despite some limitations to the capacity of the 
Agents. The technical assistance package and referrals to other social services, on the other hand, 
were found not to be formatted to the needs of disadvantaged entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, this study brings evidence that even a well-designed program will not become sufficiently 
effective and sustainable in the absence of mechanisms that promote coordination among the 
different institutions involved. In the case of Vida Melhor, the lack of coordination and communication 
among governmental bodies made it difficult for UNIS Coordinators in the field to link up with other 
services (social workers, health, education and others), without decisions on cooperation coming 
from the top at each respective area’s Secretariat.
The main lessons from the case study identified the needs (i) to improve the follow-up on 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs’ demands for products and services (such as vocational training, 
microcredit, registration of companies and donation of equipment), through fostering partnerships 
with local institutions to reduce rigidity and logistical difficulties; (ii) to include on-the-job training, 
broader themes and motivation dynamics in the training of Development Agents; (iii) to rethink  
the political and institutional arrangements for effective intersectoral coordination, one that  
assures continuity of leadership, political commitment and monitoring of field institutions; and  
(iv) to improve information management and develop a system with managerial functions  
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Carlos sells grilled meat skewers on the streets  
of Bairro da Paz, an informal settlement of 
30,000 squatters in Salvador, Bahia. Carlos had 
never known exactly how much he spent and 
earned in the course of his work. He only knew 
that the skewers he grilled in a re-used paint 
can hardly made ends meet for his family. With 
the Urban Vida Melhor Program, Carlos learned 
to calculate his costs and revenue, and his sales 
jumped by 30% when he started using a specially 
made meat-grilling cart, which is both good-
looking and meets official hygiene standards.
Carlos is one of 11,000 economically 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs1 assisted by the 
Vida Melhor Program, created by the Government 
of the State of Bahia in 2011, to promote the 
social and productive inclusion of disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs, most of them poor, self-employed 
workers whose most common feature is not 
making any distinction between resources 
consumed by their business and those that sustain 
their families. Their economic activity is often 
carried out at home, and money spent on the 
business gets mixed with expenses to meet the 
family’s needs. This leaves many disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs out of official statistics.
The life and work of disadvantaged entrepreneurs 
are fundamentally precarious, in terms of housing, 
income and consumption. Most of them live in 
informal settlements, their business revenue is 
small and erratic (when the entrepreneur is taken 
ill, there is simply no income and no savings for 
a rainy day); and their business provides nothing 
but a subsistence living, with limited access to 
consumption to sustain their families. These 
people have few chances of getting a paid  
job with working papers. 
In Greater Salvador, about 20% of the 
economically active population (EAP) has 
historically been self-employed. In 2011, that 
meant around 400,000 people. If we also include 
domestic employees, undocumented wage 
earners and unpaid employees as precarious 
workers, that figure climbs to 830,000 
individuals. Adding in the unemployed,2 we have 
over 1.1 million people, about 53% of the EAP.3 
These numbers mean that “by its magnitude and 
its structural nature, the reproduction of these 
forms of labor can no longer be explained away 
as a residual or transitory phenomenon.”4  
Even with the expansion of formal employment 
in recent years, it is unlikely that all these people 
will soon be brought into the economy’s formal 
sector as regular wage earners.
Therefore, the development challenge that the 
government of Bahia hopes to resolve through 
Vida Melhor is to overcome the social, economic 
and cultural barriers faced by disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs in their context of vulnerability,  
by promoting their economic and social 
inclusion, both by enhancing their businesses and 
incomes and by providing access to other social 
programs. As a result, an alternative approach is 
needed, no longer focused on bring people out 
of their disadvantaged economic sectors, 
but rather on strengthening them, based on 
a better understanding of the economy. It is 
precisely this outlook that makes Vida Melhor 
innovative. It is a much broader challenge that 
goes beyond the limits of a statewide program 
in Bahia, as it delves into how to institutionalize 
public policies for the social and economic 
inclusion of one of society’s least structured 
sectors. This leads to Vida Melhor’s delivery 
challenge: how a governmental policy program 
can interact and serve a highly vulnerable and 
unstructured audience, for whom it is hard to 
adapt to the public sector’s administrative rules, 
and where family and business accounts  
are often co-mingled.
Introduction and the Context of  
the Case Study
1. “The economy of disadvantaged sectors (setores populares) refers to activities whose economic rationale 
is based on the generation of resources (monetary or otherwise) whose purpose is to promote and restore 
sustenance, and on the use of one’s own human resources, thus adding labor units but not investing capital. This 
economy includes activities carried out both by low-income individuals and by families, as well as different modes 
of associative labor, whether formalized or not.” (Kraychette 2000).
2. Unemployed people “with a labor potential” are part of the Vida Melhor target audience. In fact, many of these 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs define themselves as “unemployed.”





The program was established in August 2011,  
in tandem with the Federal Government’s “Brazil 
Without Poverty” program, to achieve social 
and productive inclusion through decent work 
for people in situations of poverty and with a 
potential to work, in order to raise their incomes.5 
The program is structured around two contexts, 
one urban and the other rural. The urban 
approach, in turn, also has two components, 
for collective disadvantaged entrepreneurs 
(solidarity economy) and for individual 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs, who are the focus 
of this study. Vida Melhor sits at the “intersection 
between the economy and society,”6 since it 
aims to promote both the economic inclusion 
of disadvantaged entrepreneurs and access 
to policies that will ensure their social rights. 
Moreover, it is clear in the concept behind  
Vida Melhor that the inclusion of disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs does not depend only on their 
own will and capacity, but also on creating a 
less hostile environment for them (particularly 
regarding public transportation, public safety, 
health, basic hygiene and schooling), thus 
demanding intersectoral initiatives.
To achieve those objectives, the strategy 
adopted by Vida Melhor is essentially to  
“get into” the geographic, social, economic and 
cultural universe of disadvantaged entrepreneurs 
and adapt to their characteristics and needs.  
The urban Vida Melhor’s approach was 
developed at the Salvador Catholic University 
(UCSAL) to meet the specificities of 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs. In 1999, the  
UCSAL launched a research and extension 
program, which is still underway, aimed at 
training multiplier agents in practices suitable 
to the sustainability of solidarity economic 
enterprises. In 2006 and again in 2009,  
the UCSAL participated in programs run by  
the Government of Bahia involving 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs. Those two 
experiences led to the adoption of the UCSAL’s 
approach into the Vida Melhor program,  
in 2011. The approach is grounded in the  
grass-roots reach of a technical assistance 
program into a community, and the way it 
interacts with entrepreneurs through dialog 
and education. Technical assistance involves 
an economic feasibility study (with major 
participatory and pedagogical aspects) on the 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs’ business activities, 
along with the identification and presentation 
of their particular demands for a package of 
services and inputs provided by the program 
(vocational training, micro-credit, registration  
of companies and donation of equipment).
Operational Flow
In operational terms, this means (i) setting up 
“Socio-Productive Inclusion Units” (UNIS) in 
poor communities, run by Social Organizations 
commissioned by the Government;7 and  
(ii) organizing local residents to be Development 
Agents, responsible for the following sequence  
of activities: (a) a diagnosis of the local 
community; (b) registration, ranking and 
selection of disadvantaged entrepreneurs;  
(c) a participatory economic feasibility study 
(EFS) that also educates disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs, in which the agent and the 
entrepreneur “discover” together the true 
value of their production and sales costs; 
(d) identification of the disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs’ demands; (e) drafting 
of a technical report based on the EFS 
and presentation of the technical report 
with individual recommendations to each 
entrepreneur; and (f) response to the needs  
of entrepreneurs for vocational training,  
micro-credit, registration of their company and 
donation of equipment. In addition, the Agent 
identifies needs of the entrepreneur’s family that 
2
The Process of Implementing the  
Vida Melhor Program
5. Government of the State of Bahia and FLEM 2014 op. cit.: 3. The target audience is defined as disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs (self-employed or, in more general terms, having a labor potential), age 18-60, with a priority for 
those enrolled in the Unified Registry for Social Programs, whose monthly family income is no more than one half 
the minimum wage per person or no more than three times the minimum wage for the entire family.
6. Inter-American Development Bank, Relatório de Avaliação – Programa Vida Melhor/SEDES, Salvador 2014: 4.
7. When the first UNIS units were set up, the Bahia State Government worked through agreements with Social 
Organizations that had previous experience in using the UCSAL methodology, with disadvantaged entrepreneurs. 
Those Social Organizations were responsible for setting up the UNIS, managing the hiring of coordinators and 
technical personnel, training and all the services provided to the disadvantaged entrepreneurs. In Brazil, Social 
Organizations are non-profit, private law, legal persons whose activities must focus on teaching, scientific 
research, technological development, protection and preservation of the environment, culture or health. These 
organizations are regulated under Law 9637, dated May 15, 1998.
10
can be met by social programs and refers  
them to health, education and social workers,  
as well as encouraging the collective organizing 
of initiatives based on networking and solidarity 
among entrepreneurs.
The information gathered by the Agents from 
entrepreneurs is periodically updated to oversee 
and assess their evolution, and is systematized in 
the Vida Melhor Information System (SIVME),  
the program’s strategic management tool.  
Figure 1 is a flow chart of Vida Melhor activities:  
(i) the SEDES selects areas to establish UNIS 
units; (ii) it selects and commissions Social 
Organizations (S.O.) to run each of them; and 
(iii) the Social Organizations select, hire and train 
Development Agents, who become responsible 
for technical assistance, ranging from the EFS to 
the package of social services.
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intersectoral management and to the program’s 
implementation, as discussed below.
It is also noteworthy that throughout its history 
(2011-2015) Vida Melhor was shut down three 
times. These were critical moments and had dire 
consequences on Development Agents (who were 
dismissed and later rehired) an on entrepreneurs 
(services to whom were suspended, at great cost 
to the program’s credibility). Those interruptions 
had to do with outside factors, State politics and 
the government’s administrative problems. In all 
cases, the Government did take steps to revive the 
program (although not always in a timely fashion) 
and/or to minimize the impact of shutdowns.
Legal Relations with  
Social Organizations
The program underwent changes in formal 
relations with the Social Organizations responsible 
for managing the UNIS units and carrying out the 
Institutional Arrangements
As a political strategy, the Vida Melhor 
Management Board, chaired by the Governor’s 
Chief of Staff and made up of Secretaries from 
each Secretariat, was created to ensure all 
necessary coordination among the program’s 
intersectoral activities. The Chief of Staff in the 
Governor’s Office played a key role in designing 
this arrangement because of his own interest in 
Vida Melhor and his political weight as chairman 
of the board. That situation, as we shall see, 
changed over time through the program’s 
successive phases.
Two Executive Committees were set up 
to handle, respectively, Vida Melhor’s rural 
and urban divisions. The urban division was 
coordinated by the Social Development 
and Anti-Poverty Secretariat (SEDES). 
From the outset, however, rivalries between 
participating Secretariats raised barriers to 
11
Effects of the Management Contract
Adoption of the management contract had different impacts on the institutions,  
the Social Organizations, the Agents and the entrepreneurs. For the SEDES, the management 
contract expedited analysis and approval of technical and accounting reports and facilitated  
add-ons and renewals of contracts with the Social Organizations. This, in theory,  
should have ensured greater continuity in services provided to Agents and entrepreneurs.  
From the standpoint of the Social Organizations, the management contract also demanded 
greater discipline and stricter planning and execution to meet the goals. That change took 
some time, but gradually the Social Organizations did adapt well, and the management 
contract allowed them to define and break out functions that had been concentrated in the 
hands of UNIS coordinators, and even provided funding to hire people to take on some of 
those functions. Meanwhile, because of specific parameters within the management contract, 
there were negative impacts on Development Agents and disadvantaged entrepreneurs, 
since, to achieve numerical targets of entrepreneurs included, less time was left for Agents 
to interact with entrepreneurs. The UNIS units reorganized to ease impacts of the changes, 
split up the themes analyzed by the EFS and reduce, when possible, the number of meetings 
between Agents and entrepreneurs, depending on the complexity of each business initiative.
fieldwork. The two Social Organizations selected 
were first commissioned without a tender process 
(through an agreement), but in early 2014 that 
agreement was replaced with a results-based 
management contract.
Under the initial agreement, the Regional Action 
Company (which has traditionally administered 
agreements with civil-society organizations, 
although in rural areas) was responsible for the 
program’s financial control and accounting, while 
the SEDES did the technical coordination.  
This mismatch between the program’s physical 
and financial oversight created red tape. Under 
the management contract, both physical and 
financial oversight were undertaken by the SEDES.
8. The UNIS units were created rather than using existing Reference Center for Social Assistance (CRAS) because 
the CRAS centers are under the institutional responsibility of municipalities, rather than the State government.
9. The Program’s goal was to set up 30 UNIS units by 2015, but only five have been created so far, due to budget 
restrictions.
10. The Federal Government’s primary, large-scale social housing program.
11. A State program to promote peace and confront violence.
12. Following Rio de Janeiro’s model of Peacemaker Police Units (UPPs), the Community Bases are police 
management and operational points, focused on prevention, located in certain disadvantaged neighborhoods in 
Salvador and Greater Salvador, in some cities along the State’s northern coast and in the interior.
Implementation 
To begin the program, the SEDES set up five 
UNIS units around the State:8 three in Salvador, 
one in Lauro de Freitas, in Greater Salvador, and 
one in Feira de Santana.9 The location and scope 
of each UNIS were defined by comparing several 
variables such as concentration of poverty and 
the presence of other governmental programs  
like Minha Casa Minha Vida,10 Pacto pela Vida11  
and Bases Comunitárias de Segurança.12  
For each UNIS, a Coordinator (with a higher 
education degree) was named, along with three 
university-level technical experts and thirty 
Development Agents. The experts help support 
the Agents, and are frequently in the field  
with them. The Agents hired by the program  
received 40 hours of training from the  
UCSAL on its approach to working with  
disadvantaged entrepreneurs.
To launch the program, the coordinators 
and experts visited and walked through the 
neighborhoods covered by their UNIS, identifying 
and mobilizing leaders, while disseminating the 
program. In early 2012, the Social Organizations 
selected and hired the Development Agents 
 in each UNIS, after disseminating public  
calls in the communities and then using  
logical-mathematic tests and personal  
interviews to select the candidates.
12
A Profile of the Development Agents
The Agents “have one foot in the Program and one foot in the community,” in the words of 
one UNIS expert. This allows them access to pockets of extreme poverty, to the homes of 
entrepreneurs and to real information. The conditions for becoming a Development Agent 
are to be a neighborhood resident, have a high school diploma, and be able to work with 
MS Word and Excel. The contracts are done through signed papers (formal employment 
under Brazilian labor law), for a 44-hour week. After they were hired, the Agents (most of 
them young women) went through 40 hours of training on the disadvantaged entrepreneurs 
approach and then began to interact with the disadvantaged entrepreneurs themselves.
Given the profile of the entrepreneurs, the approach had to work on subjective dimensions 
of socialization alongside the technical dimension, for the program to “get in” to the world 
of disadvantaged entrepreneurs, to involve them and better identify their demands. In that 
sense, the Development Agents play a key role, mainly due to the rapport and empathy they 
are able to establish with the entrepreneurs. When first approached, the entrepreneurs are 
mistrustful. Gradually, the Agent gains their trust and begins to work in collaboration  
with the entrepreneur.
Once the Agents are trained, they begin to 
interact with the disadvantaged entrepreneurs 
on Economic Feasibility Studies (EFS), which 
is generally one of the first diagnostic activities 
carried out by the Agents as they begin to 
interact with the entrepreneurs. The EFS process 
collects data on their business, while also 
educating entrepreneurs and identifying their 
needs for technical assistance and public social 
services. Application of the EFS has shown 
that the entrepreneurs’ knowledge of their own 
income is a gradual learning process, through 
dialog between the entrepreneur and the Agent. 
During this educational process led by the 
Agents, the impact of sensitizing entrepreneurs 
to budgetary aspects of their business is very 
clear. The entrepreneurs come out of the EFS 
experience with a higher level of knowledge 
about themselves and their own business.  
This enhances the process of identifying the 
specific demands of each business and ensures 
much more qualified and precise responses.
The next two sections present the most 
relevant outcomes, as well as key challenges 
that arose during the Program, taking into 
account organizational, institutional and political 






In early 2015, the FLEM did an evaluation of 
Vida Melhor. The main indicators produced by 
that evaluation, synthesized in the following 
table, show an excellent performance by 
Agents to bring in entrepreneurs and during 
the EFS “diagnostic” phase, and good 
performance in the delivery of technical  
reports and identification of demands.  
However, the Program’s delivery of goods and 
services in terms of technical assistance for 
productive inclusion clearly fell short of  
those demands.
Results of Vida Melhor for  
Disadvantaged Entrepreneurs
Number of entrepreneurs included in registry 
(target: 12,000)
•  13,067 (11,290 active plus 1,777 dropouts)
•  115%
Indicator Results and % of Coverage
Number of EFS done 2012-2014 / 
Number of entrepreneurs in the registry
•  9,753/11,209
•  86.4%
Number of technical reports delivered / 
Number of entrepreneurs in the registry
•  6,070/11,290
•  53.8%
Number of demands identified / 
Entrepreneurs
•  6,921 want training / 
    11,290 = 61%
•  4,444 want equipment / 
    11,290 = 44%








Micro-credit provided / 
Number of entrepreneurs in the registry
•  338/11,290
•  3%
Entrepreneur satisfaction with meetings 
on EFS (# of meetings, content shared, 
knowledge gained)
•  Total of “good” plus “very good”
    near 100%
Entrepreneur satisfaction with technical report 
(comprehension of report, content shared, 
knowledge gained)
•  Total of “good” plus “very good”
    between 95% - 98%
Font: FLEM 2015, op.cit. 
The Vida Melhor Program surpassed its target 
of enrolling 12,000 entrepreneurs. Of those 
who entered the registry and remained in the 
Program, over 86% did Economic Feasibility 
Studies, but only 53.8% received a technical 
report with the outcome of their EFS. In 61% of 
the cases, the entrepreneurs expressed a need 
for vocational training, while 44% felt a need 
for goods or equipment. Of the entrepreneurs 
demanding training, however, only 28,6% 
actually participated in vocational courses, 
and of those in need of equipment, only 27% 
actually received anything. We have no data 
on how many entrepreneurs asked for micro-
credit, only that just 3% of all the entrepreneurs 





The Vida Melhor’s strategy was based on 
the Program’s presence in poor urban 
communities through each UNIS and local 
resident Development Agents, interacting with 
entrepreneurs through dialog and education.  
This format was successful in the role of UNIS 
and particularly the Development Agents’ 
diagnostic activities, to map out the areas, enroll 
and rank entrepreneurs, carry out feasibility 
studies and do technical reports on business 
initiatives. The main barriers faced and lessons 
learned to enhance the Program’s performance 
refer to: (i) follow-up on the entrepreneurs’ 
demands for services and inputs;13 (ii) training 
of Development Agents;14 (iii) handling of 
information; and (iv) institutional arrangements 
and effective intersectoral coordination.
i) Follow-up on  
Entrepreneurs’ Demands
After the Agents conclude the EFS and the 
technical report, when technical assistance  
for inclusive production actually begins, several 
practical problems thwart the Program’s 
effectiveness. While the diagnostic and 
educational work was effective and productive, 
the services and inputs needed to improve the 
business initiatives – to be provided by the 
Program’s partners – suffered from rules and 
habits that are poorly adapted to the specificities 
of disadvantaged entrepreneurs.
Vida Melhor was designed to package together 
four kinds of services or inputs: vocational 
training, micro-credit, registration of companies 
and donation of equipment. The UNIS, however, 
has no authority over such goods and services, 
which must be provided by other institutions. 
As opposed to the EFS, which adapts to the 
specificities of disadvantaged entrepreneurs, 
these goods and services are not delivered  
in suitable formats.
For vocational training, entrepreneurs are 
referred by the Agents to courses given by 
Vida Melhor’s partner institutions, but are 
often blocked by barriers related to their own 
precarious backgrounds. Courses in the  
“S System”15 have costs and schedules that 
are unsuited to disadvantaged entrepreneurs, 
while PRONATEC16 has minimum schooling 
requirements, which, even when low, most of 
them simply cannot meet. Micro-credit raises 
formal restrictions for anyone who has ever 
defaulted on a bank loan, which is often the  
case of disadvantaged entrepreneurs.  
The registration of companies is not attractive 
for many disadvantaged entrepreneurs because, 
even though, fees were reduced by the Individual 
Micro-Entrepreneur Law,17 the cost of registration 
compromises other immediate expenses, which 
for many are more important than any future 
advantages registration might provide (better 
procurement conditions, credit cards, social 
security). The work done by SEBRAE, based 
on rigid targets for the formal registration of 
informal entrepreneurs in the broad sense, has 
also been criticized by the UNIS units.18 Some 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs have chosen the 
formal registration path and have concretely 
benefited from it, but they are a minority.
The donation of assets such as equipment 
to be used by the entrepreneurs’ companies, 
promised by Vida Melhor, suffers from delays 
in the purchase and donation of equipment by 
Challenges Faced and Lessons Learned
13. The FLEM evaluation treats such actions as separate projects within a single program, with institutional 
responsibilities located outside the program and functions beyond the reach of Agents, and suggests that  
the Social Organizations’ contracts not hold them responsible for targets related to these activities.
14. The FLEM evaluation found that technical assistance activities involve building technical-professional 
information and knowledge, which is not provided in the Agents’ training. Even the EFS is recalled by 
entrepreneurs more for its emotional and social aspects than by any of its technical features. Meanwhile, Agents 
are praised in the evaluation for their dedication, identification with the Program’s proposed methodology, 
understanding of their own leadership roles and their capacity to bond with entrepreneurs.
15. The “S System” involves a number of institutions, the most important of which, in urban areas, are the SEBRAE 
(Brazilian Service to Support Micro and Small Businesses), the SENAI (National Industrial Learning Service)  
and the SENAC (National Learning Service for Commerce), all of which offer technical assistance courses  
and vocational training.
16. The National Program for Access to Technical Education and Employment (PRONATEC) is a Federal 
Government program for the professional and technological education of youth, workers and beneficiaries  
of income-transfer programs.
17. Complementary Law 128/2008, which defines Individual Micro-entrepreneurs as entrepreneurs whose  
yearly gross income is no more than R$ 60,000, and simplifies the process of legally formalizing a company,  
among other provisions.
18. IDB 2014, op.cit.
18
the SEDES, due to red tape in public-sector 
procurement procedures. Entrepreneurs 
conclude their EFS together with the Agents 
and feel better prepared and motivated to 
improve their business practices, but they need 
better instruments, whose delivery is very slow. 
Despite delays, some entrepreneurs have been 
very pleased with the quality of most of the 
equipment, such as ready-made kitchens,  
meat-grilling carts and embroidery machines.  
It was also difficult for entrepreneurs to use 
 some of the equipment, for example digital 
sewing machines.
The evaluation of Vida Melhor revealed that the 
impact of the UNIS’ powerlessness over technical 
assistance activities was a poor response  
to demands expressed by entrepreneurs.  
Some solutions were found to this problem:
To reduce the rigidity and logistical difficulties 
of the training courses, Social Organizations 
and UNIS units partnered with local institutions 
experienced in vocational training. In Bairro 
da Paz, for example, the Social Organization 
revived a partnership it had with the local Colibri 
Cooperative, for training in food preparation and 
sewing, with equipment donated by Vida Melhor 
and from overseas sources (a European Union 
project and an Italian NGO). These experiences 
were only partially successful, mainly due to the 
lack of additional funding to organize courses 
inside the communities.19 Other creative solutions 
included scholarships for disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs to participate in courses given 
by S-System and PRONATEC partners, so they 
could afford to leave their work to attend classes.
To overcome the problems of access to  
micro-credit for disadvantaged entrepreneurs, 
the UNIS in Feira de Santana created a Solidarity 
Revolving Credit Fund (an arrangement 
frequently promoted by the Banco do 
Nordeste), with support from an outside 
agency. The Vida Melhor Board also partnered 
with other institutions, such as the Banco do 
Nordeste (CrediAmigo Program), BNDES20 and 
Desenbahia,21 to facilitate access to loans,  
but these partnerships are limited since they  
still restrict loans for anyone who has ever 
defaulted in the past.
As regards efforts to formalize the registration 
of disadvantaged entrepreneurs, discussions 
are underway with the SEBRAE to find a way 
around its rigid targets for enrollment of informal 
entrepreneurs in the broad sense, and to 
consider the registration criteria used by the EFS.
Finally, on equipment donations, each UNIS 
will give courses on the use of the equipment 
before delivery. For embroidery machines, for 
example, whose instructions were unintelligible 
to entrepreneurs, the UNIS organized an ad hoc 
course that solved the problem.
ii) Training the Development Agents
The initial training of Development Agents 
is limited in that it does not cover problems 
that typically come up only during the actual 
fieldwork, caused by the emotional impact of 
close-up involvement in intra-family problems 
(such as family violence, for example) or the 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs’ precarious living 
and working conditions, i.e., issues that underline 
these people’s needs for policies to ensure their 
rights, which the Agents were not trained to 
recognize or handle. The SEDES must provide 
Agents with on-the-job training, using exchanges, 
horizontal contacts with teams in other locations, 
motivation dynamics and social events.22 They 
need to feel less isolated and more supported, 
both technically and in terms of motivation. In 
response to such demands for training, since 
2014 the SEDES has provided a continuing 
education plan for Agents, covering broader 
themes such as social welfare, political education, 
technical assistance for networks/groups, gender 
and ethnic issues, accessibility, environment and 
sustainability and interpersonal relations.23
iii) Handling Information
The Agents record their interactions with 
entrepreneurs on notecards that are entered 
19. IDB 2014, op. cit.
20. National Economic and Social Development Bank, a federally owned bank and the government’s main long-
term financial agent for investments in all segments of the economy, to implement social, regional  
and environmental policies.
21. The State of Bahia’s development agency, a State Government credit institution for social and  
economic inclusion.
22. Other noteworthy demands from the Agents refer to: (i) safety and communication (access to mobile phones) 
in the field; (ii) higher wages; and (iii) professional growth in general (source: IDB 2014, op.cit.).
23. IDB 2014, op.cit.
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into the Vida Melhor Information System 
(SIVME).24 When the UNIS units began their 
work, it was hard to feed the system due to its 
limited functionalities. The extreme diversity of 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs meant that certain 
situations could only be perceived in the field, 
and the UNIS often had to sit down with the 
programmers to rework the system. A new tool 
was therefore developed in 2014 to help the 
UNIS and Agents transfer the disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs’ data (expenses, sales and 
revenue) into a format managers could use: 
the Entrepreneur’s Handbook. There is no sign, 
however, that the SIVME will rapidly evolve to 
become fully functional and meet the need to 
support decision-making.
iv) Institutional Arrangements and 
Effective Intersectoral Coordination 
There can be no effective coordination among 
different sectors without an operable institutional 
framework. This has hindered UNIS’ work and 
their response to demands from entrepreneurs 
and their families requiring inter-sectoral policies.
The Vida Melhor Program’s intersectoral 
coordination was criticized as insufficient,  
due mainly to: (i) changes in the Governor’s 
Office that sacrificed leadership for the Program, 
since the successors did not share the same 
commitment to Vida Melhor; (ii) frequent 
changes in the command of Secretariats involved 
in the program; and (iii) the partisan divvying 
up of Secretariats in a broad government 
coalition. For those reasons, the Management 
Board almost never met and the Executive 
Committee, with no guidance from the Board, 
lost any real decision-making power. Within the 
Executive Committee, moreover, there was little 
coordination between the SEDES and the SETRE, 
which are responsible, respectively, for individual 
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial associations.
That lack of coordination and communication 
among governmental bodies made it difficult 
in the field for each UNIS Coordinator to link 
up with other services (social workers, health, 
education and others), since decisions on 
cooperation are put off by each Secretariat’s 
superiors who do not prioritize Vida Melhor 
beneficiaries for local services, and there is no 
Executive Committee involvement in decision-
making either. The outcome of weak coordination 
has impacts on how Agents can relate to 
entrepreneurs, who feel let down by those they 
expected to provide the services they need.
The most important coordination should take 
place with CRAS25 centers, but this relationship 
is described as variable and sporadic, depending 
on the location and the availability of the 
professionals responsible for each CRAS  
(“With no institutional arrangement, it’s up to 
people.”) Each CRAS, meanwhile, answers to 
the Municipal Government, which in Salvador 
is headed by a party in opposition to the State 
Government. This explains why the enrollment 
of Vida Melhor beneficiaries in the Unified 
Registry for Social Programs (run by the CRAS), 
which should be compulsory, was only made a 
priority by the State Government, thus reducing 
access to other programs for the neediest 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs.26
The Vida Melhor evaluation clearly raised the need 
for steps to make intersectoral work more effective, 
such as locating its coordination in an upper-
echelon institution committed to the Program, 
making it stand out as a political priority and 
holding other participating institutions accountable 
for its implementation and monitoring.  
Vida Melhor was originally formatted as a priority 
of the Government of Bahia, with strong leadership 
from the Governor’s Chief of Staff to get it 
organized. Even when that high-level leadership 
faded, the Program and its main stakeholders 
upheld their commitment to the disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs. Perhaps only a new champion, 
however, will be able to improve the performance 
of Vida Melhor’s partner organizations.
Continuity of leadership is also important 
to uphold a political commitment. The poor 
performance of intersectoral coordination 
24. The SIVME was first developed by the SEDES, for lack of any other system with functions suitable to  
the needs of Vida Melhor. It was turned over to the Governor’s Office to be integrated into the State’s IT platform.  
That integration was only partial, however, and the system is still incomplete (especially in terms of  
managerial report functions).
25. The Reference Center for Social Assistance (CRAS) are the main local physical structures that provide basic 
social protection for socially vulnerable families.
26. There is no data on the percentage of Vida Melhor beneficiaries enrolled in the Unified Registry. The State 
Government’s decision not to require that enrollment, as a condition for participation in the Vida Melhor Program, 
should be seen as a precautionary measure, considering the potential for friction in relations between the  
State and the municipality, over partisan bickering.
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around Vida Melhor had much to do with 
frequent changes in the command of the State 
Secretariats involved in the program, and with 
the splitting up of those Secretariats among 
different members of the governing coalition. 
After the new Governor took office in 2015, 
the Program was reorganized (although basic 
policies have remained) when the former Social 
Development and Anti-Poverty Secretariat 
(SEDES) merged into a new Secretariat of 
Justice, Human Rights and Social Development 
(SJDHDS), along with the former Secretariat of 
Justice, Citizenry and Human Rights. After some 
initial uncertainty, the SJDHDS ratified Vida 
Melhor’s coordination. The State Government 
seized the restructuring of the Secretariat as 
a chance to rethink Vida Melhor, particularly 
regarding its integration with other sectoral 
policies and services.
Another lesson learned in the institutional sphere 
is that building integration and coordination 
between institutions takes time. To achieve 
coordination among several institutions at once 
(social work, health, education, etc.) in the field, 
it must be built at the top of the hierarchy and 
be monitored in the field, since decisions on 
that relationship (which in practical terms mean 
prioritizing Vida Melhor beneficiaries for local 
services) are made at the top of the respective 
Secretariats and must be monitored by the 
Executive Committee. It is also fundamental 
to have an internal communications strategy 
between the areas, for the Program to be 
known within the Government itself, by all the 
areas and authorities involved in it. Finally, due 
to gaps in coordination between sectors and 
institutions, Vida Melhor was not very effective 
at referring the most vulnerable disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs to policy bodies that might ensure 
their rights. Nonetheless, the approaches used  
by Vida Melhor – working through local  
grass-roots networks, using resident agents, 
relating business’ management to families’ 
dynamics, and the educational dimension of 
the EFS – were essentially correct. One notable 
impact was the sensitizing of entrepreneurs to 






Vida Melhor is an innovative program active  
in a novel setting, rife with uncertainties.  
This means that it must be adaptable by its 
very nature. The Program’s critical points are 
clear to its main stakeholders, who have taken 
measures for successive adjustments, within 
their realms of power. Vida Melhor has been 
able to adapt its design and implementation 
stages to its target audience’s specific needs 
and capacities. The Program’s design clearly 
foresees the need for intersectoral relations, 
to overcome barriers holding disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs back, and to respond to their 
demands for social protection and promotion 
policies. Mechanisms to identify those barriers 
and demands are operational in Vida Melhor, 
but institutional arrangements must be 
reassessed to make intersectoral dynamics 
more effective and allow the Program to fully 
achieve its objective of supporting producers 
as individuals, families or associations, in both 
urban and rural areas.
Conclusions – Final Remarks 
Appendices
Vida Melhor’s Time Line
• First semester, 2011: Initial organization of Vida Melhor begins, led by the Governor’s Office.
• August 2011: State Decree establishes Vida Melhor.
• October-December 2011: Program begins, with selection and hiring (through agreements) of 
Social Organizations to manage the UNIS units, after which the Social Organizations hire UNIS 
Coordinators and Technical Experts.
• January-December 2012: Gradual establishment of 5 UNIS units; selection and hiring of 
Development Agents by the Social Organizations; first activities with entrepreneurs (turning point).
• December 2012 - April 2013: Program shut down following a denunciation by an opposition 
member of the State Assembly27 (turning point).
• May-December 2013: Agreements with the Social Organizations are renewed and the program 
resumes its work (mostly to monitor the situation of previously enrolled participants, with limited 
inclusion of new entrepreneurs); budget cutbacks, accounting discrepancies at the UNIS units and 
a new interruption of the program (turning point), followed by the creation of a State Government 
task force to avoid a total shutdown.
• January-December 2014: Relationship between the State and the Social Organizations is amended 
(from agreements to management contracts) and work resumes, including the enrollment of new 
entrepreneurs (turning point); the Program is evaluated by the IDB.
• January-June 2015: New Governor, administrative reform in the State Government (creation of  
a new Secretariat responsible for Vida Melhor) and interruption of the Program; the Program  
is evaluated by the FLEM and then reorganized under the new Secretariat.
27. A member of the State Legislative Assembly from an opposition party accused the Governor of commissioning 
Social Organizations with no capacity or qualifications to manage the UNIS units. The accusation was groundless, 
since the Social Organizations’ staff members fully met the technical requirements of the contract and the 
same Social Organizations had already participated in previous experiences with disadvantaged entrepreneurs, 
sponsored by the UCSAL. Even so, the Program was suspended while the Government prepared its defense,  
which was presented to the State Assembly and to the public at large.
24
Inter-American Development Bank, Relatório de Avaliação – Programa Vida Melhor/SEDES, Salvador 2014
FLEM, Programa Vida Melhor Urbano – SEDES/FLEM – Relatório de Eficácia e Efetividade 
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